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Moral Tradition and Individuality, by John Kekes;
xii & 245 pp. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1989, $27.50.

Discussed by Richard Eldridge

Historicism, old and new, has taught us how much of human
thought, speech, and action stems not from pure reason and its
ideas, but from the particularities of cultural contexts. Given our awareness of historico-cultural diversities of expression and action, it is hard
not to be impressed by Richard Rorty's recommendation that we follow
Freud and see the person not as "a formed, unified, present, selfcontained substance, something capable of being seen steadily and
whole," and something the sight of which might ground an objective
morality, but instead as "a tissue of contingent relations, a web which
stretches backward and forward through past and future time."1 Yet,
despite this, it remains hard to give up the ideal of an objective morality
grounded in the nature of persons. Rejecting all objective self-legislation
on the part of humanity seems to amount to saying that anything goes,
as long as the context is drawn peculiarly enough. Human ingenuity
in narrating contexts being what it is, this seems intolerable. A synthesizing compromise of historicism and objectivism seems called for, leaving room for adventuristic personal improvisations inside a frame of
objective public morality. This isjust what we find in the most interesting
recent works ofmoral philosophy, in the books of figures such as Nagel,8
Hampshire,3 Stout,4 and Stocker,5 where a lingering regard for public,
proceduraljustice is combined with pleas for personal experimentalism
Philosophy and Literature, © 1990, 14: 387-394
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and condemnations of grand moralizing. And this is also what we find
in John Kekes's Moral Tradition and Individuality, a work that both continues this impulse to marry historicism and objectivism and deepens
it enormously by sketching and illustrating a compelling moral psychology.
Kekes synthesizes Aristode's essentialist eudaimonism, Hume's emphases on the centrality of sentiment and custom in human life, and
Mill's defense of individuality. The result is a liberal eudaimonism or
"eudaimonistic objectivism" (p. 204), relying on ontologically subjective
but epistemologically objective standards for leading a good life and
falling between subjectivist voluntarism and traditionalist essentialism.
This liberal eudaimonism is urged through careful elaboration of the
central notion of a moral perspective, a hierarchy of pardy traditionafforded and pardy self-created commitments. Kekes describes the
processes of developing and deepening a moral perspective throughout
one's life principally by noting the various successes and failures of
figures such as Oedipus, Strether in TL· Ambassadors, Ivan Ilych, and
Montaigne. Strether and Montaigne succeed in leading good lives, for
good reasons, by developing suitable moral perspectives and living according to them, where Oedipus and Ivan Ilych fail—Oedipus by relying
too much on himself against the grain of his culture, as a subjectivist
voluntarist might urge, and Ilych by relying too much on the stale,
surface mores of a dying culture, as a traditionalist essentialist might
urge. Only appeal to a suitable moral perspective can enable us to achieve
the balance of "deep private promptings and conventional forms" (p.
108) necessary for a good life. Moral perspectives draw their contents
from three overlapping sources, roughly correlatable with Aristode,
Hume, and Mill.

(1) Deep natural conventions derive from certain "universal human
characteristics," specifically "facts of the body, self, and social life" (p.
28). People lead less good lives when they are injured or malnourished
or sick, when they are unable to develop their talents or to do what
diey like, and when there is no customary social authority or an unjust
division of labor. The deep natural conventions enjoin us not to produce
these kinds of universal harms. (It is noteworthy that these deep conventions chiefly prohibit public harm to others. There are no deep,
universal conventions of personal morality, which is more constructivist
than realist. This is a deeply anti-Platonic, anti-Kantian theme in Kekes's
writing and in much recent moral philosophy. Flexibility and liberality
are purchased at the loss of systematic concern for the structure of the
soul and its motives.)
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(2)There are variable conventions of decency. One does such tilings
as shake hands, tell jokes, offer congratulations, and observe birthdays.
These rituals differ widely across societies. But participating in some
such variable conventions is a central way of expressing and reinforcing
a shared social identity, and this too is necessary for a good life. Though
bodi variable and deep conventions can be inconsistent or faulty, for
example as a result of nonmoral technological developments, what diey
prescribe is nonetheless prima facie good.
(3)Lasdy, there is personal morality. We must all develop our characters in one way rather than another, balancing our talents against the
possible identities afforded by our social background. Doing well here
is a matter of responding to complex moral situations, where intuition,
rooted in awareness of deep and variable conventions, breaks down.
At this level, all moral theories based on conceptions of human nature
must be rejected. No single good of character is necessary for a good
life. Moral principles are here at best abstractions from concurring
judgments about how to balance tradition and individuality well, and
they must be subordinated to thesejudgments, not taken as their guides.
Character is prior to volition and its principles.
In sounding diese last themes, Kekes echoes the recent views of
Williams, Hampshire, and Nagel, but he notes, against them, that conflict is not central to our moral lives. Normally at least, given the background guidance afforded by the deep and variable conventions and
given our capacities for creative moral reflection, we are able to achieve
a reasonable understanding of how we might live well here and now.
Though it requires resolution, honesty, and (contrary to Plato and
Kierkegaard) significant material support, it is not in the end so hard
to lead a good life. "The ultimate test of the goodness of our lives is
whether they involve the lasting possession of external and internal
goods and whether the satisfactions derived from their possession outweigh, in quantity and quality, such hardship and suffering as we experience. Only lives with deep roots in personal and social morality can
pass this test" (p. 202). To have these roots in one's life is to have both
self-direction, or the ability to live according to one's developed moral
perspective, and decency, or the natural and tradition-afforded habit
of living cooperatively with others. To have these things is normally to
come pretty close to leading a good life.
Moral Tradition and Individuality is a thoroughly relaxed, reasonable,
decent, clear, and serious book. The appeals to literary cases are sensitive
and dramatic. It expresses widi exemplary attractiveness and care a
conception ofthe moral life diat is very much in the air and that possesses
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real power. Its force and charm are undeniable. But here are some
interrelated Kantian reservations.

First, Kekes's arguments against voluntarism— the view that ought
implies can—are not compelling. It is true that education and character
are prior to particular choices; in that sense, contrary to existentialism,
"choices do not make moral agents" (p. 42). But it does not follow that
ought fails to imply can and that we may be righdy blamed for what
we were unable not to do. The reason is that, as Kekes elsewhere notes,

we can change our psychological states and actions through moral reflection (pp. 158-59). His careful reading of Strether's development in
TL· Ambassadors would itself seem to be a case of partly willed and partly
reasoned change of character, achieved over a period of time through

moral reflection. If this is how characters are typically developed, then

we are over time more responsible for our characters than Kekes holds
us to be in criticizing voluntarism. A second argument, turning on the
claim that people experience moral dilemmas, seems to rely on an
equivocation on "moral." It is true that people experience dilemmas
related to action, dilemmas that are in just that sense moral, but it does
not follow, as Kekes seems to take it to follow, that there are no categorical
action-related values universally commanded for us by the fact that we
have wills and consistendy realizable in a fully just world. Respect for
persons, oneself and others, may well be such a value, even if it is
contingendy impossible to realize this value universally in our world as
it stands.

Second, following Julia Annas, Kekes misreads Kantianism as encouraging us to be cold-hearted monsters of duty, without regard for
either feelings or the satisfaction of natural wants (pp. 178-79). But,
as Marcia Baron has replied to Annas in this journal,6 that is neither
Kant's view nor is it the most plausible version of Kantianism. Instead,
it is of a piece with respecting persons that one regards certain feelings
and wants, in others and in oneself, as natural and deserving of moral
standing.
Finally, Kekes's treatment of the crucial issue of the adequacy of a
moral perspective is unclear and inadequate. He argues that
a moral perspective conforms to minimal standards of adequacy, and it
will foster good lives if it satisfies die wants created by die facts of the
body, self, and social life, prompts the observance of the appropriate deep
and variable conventions of a healthy social morality, and if it has order,
coherence, richness, realism, appeal, and latitude. Conformity to these
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minimal conditions is necessary but not sufficient for die justification of
eudaimonistically conceived moral perspectives, (p. 184)

Thirty pages later the condition seems to be a sufficient one. "What
makes it reasonable to regard moral perspectives as adequate is that
they meet the three conditions discussed above" (p. 214). Here it is hard
to be confident that there is a difference between its being genuinely
reasonable (for everyone) to regard a moral perspective as adequate
and its actually being so. When it comes to the evaluation of moral
perspectives, it is hard even to distinguish epistemological correspondism from epistemological coherentism. To what fact could ourjudgment
diat a certain moral perspective is adequate correspond, apart from its
being fully reasonable to take it to be adequate? It matters litde whether
we take its being reasonable to regard a moral perspective as adequate
as an object to which our views might correspond or as something
required for the coherence of our beliefs. What matters is the reasonableness itself.

More importandy, however, are there ever fully healthy social moralities that do not call for significant revision? Participants in prevailing
social moralities who lead creative, coherent, flexible, and fulfilling lives,
shaped by moral perspectives meeting die conditions listed, can fail to
engage with the structural defects of the social moralities they inhabit
and may in that sense not lead good lives. It is not far-fetched to regard
die lives of most Americans, for example, as marred in this way. Rewards
and opportunities in our society continue to be distributed out of habit
and culture on the basis of morally irrelevant features such as race and
class membership, even when there is personal good will present between individuals. This persistent structural social fact mars the lives
of all members of societies in which it obtains, and to fail to challenge
it is to fail in one way to live well. Some talk of justice may then be
necessary in order to construct a more adequate account of die adequacy
of a moral perspective. It may be that all and only moral perspectives
that include a significant concern for justice or fairness in the ordering
of die world are adequate. Kekes leaves us with a morality of preventing
gross public harms, of conformity to mores, and of quasi-aesthetic improvisation, not a morality ofjustice.
Against this thought, Kekes offers us die figure of Montaigne, who
in Kekes's reading, "faced a fundamental conflict between public and
private life" (p. 228) and resolved it by giving his energies over to die
requirement that the public world be reordered in the interests ofjustice
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only en mesure. "He will soil himself [with public service] up to a point
but not beyond it" (p. 229). Following Montaigne's example, so understood, "what must be done is to make only 'limited and conditional'
commitments to external goods; the right attitude is, ? frankly tell them
my limits' " (p. 230). So much for public service, and no more: one
needs "freedom, tranquility, and leisure" either "to write and to reflect"
or odierwise to do what one will (p. 228).
How compelling is this reading of Montaigne and his moral exemplariness? It is notoriously hard to fix Montaigne's life and character
in view, as he himself recognized. "Irresolution," he tells us, "seems to
me the most common and apparent defect of our nature. . . . We are
all patchwork."7 He does not shrink from acknowledging his own inconsistency. In commenting on what he calls "my own unstable posture"
(p. 155), he observes that "I cannot keep my subject [myself] still. It
goes along befuddled and staggering widi a natural drunkenness" (p.
313). His intelligence is aphoristic and occasional, rather than systematic
and disciplined, in keeping with his skeptical view that man is "the
investigator without knowledge, the magistrate withoutjurisdiction, and
all in all, the fool of the farce" (p. 379). Politically, his pyrrhonism and
humanism support a moderate, anti-Scholastic reformism, as Kekes
suggests.

Yet Montaigne's thought, in its skepticism and anti-Scholasticism, is
equally the radically Augustinian and Kantian inwardizing of Christianity. In tracing his own and our defects and inconsistencies, he is
everywhere conscious of the unforeseeable divine judgment that is to
come. The moral of our ignorance and incapacity is that we stand in
need of God's grace.
Nor can man raise himself above himself and humanity; for he can see
only with his own eyes, and seize only widi his own grasp. He will rise if
God by exception lends him a hand; he will rise by abandoning and
renouncing his own means, and letting himself be raised and uplifted by
purely celestial means. It is for our Christian faitii, not for his Stoical
virtue, to aspire to diat divine and miraculous metamorphosis, (p. 253)

If we do not have jurisdiction over our fates, it is because God does.
We can do nodiing either to merit or to anticipate our salvation. We
are, in consequence, thrown back on the cultivation of our nature and
character as God has given diem to us. "I love life and cultivate it just
as God has been pleased to grant it to us" (p. 451). But this acceptance
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of one's character is not quite or only the relaxed worldly humanism
diat Kekes urges on us. It is Stoic acceptance in the face ofour ignorance,
coupled with the hope of unmerited divine forgiveness. One must and
will do what one's nature will have one do, though even here that will
mean rejecting idleness: "the soul that has no fixed goal loses itself" (p.
7). This may well mean making measured compromises with the demands of public life. But these compromises and the more general
shapings of our lives by our characters are made less in assurance and
self-confidence than in despair.
Here is a picture of human life that resonates not with Hume's, but
with Kant's sense of the tragedy of our existence. One way of appreciating Kant's moral psychology and moral theology is to notice that,
in his view, we are allotted by practical reason two conflicting sorts of
open-ended, perfect duties: duties toward others and duties toward
ourselves. We are bound simultaneously to maximal benevolence and
maximal cultivation of our talents. No one can satisfy both demands
fully. We are all bound to assert ourselves, and to err, on one side or
the other, refining our palates while ignoring the hungry, or helping
the impoverished while sacrificing our individuality. Yet one must do
what one can and will with a whole heart, with acknowledgment of
error, and with hope of forgiveness. It may be that Montaigne balanced
his private life against the needs of the public in this spirit, not in the
spirit that Kekes discerns, though it is not clear that we are in a position
to judge this. Kantian voluntarism and liberal objectivism may not be
incompatible.
This picture of human life will perhaps sound tyrannically religious
against the relaxed and historically sensitive picture of human life that
Kekes develops by following Hume, as though, in addition to inheriting
customs, we also always stood under the judgment of either a stern but
just God or our own consciences. The difficulty of Kantianism is that
it threatens to be too severe and unlivable; it makes morality too hard.
But the difficulty of a moral view inspired by Hume is that it threatens
to make morality too comfortable, aspiration-denying, and distanced
from justice. Can there be a moral theory that plausibly accepts our
Kantian obligations and our continuing failures in them, but that is
nonetheless natural and livable in offering us the hopes of our forgiveness of one another?
Swarthmore College
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